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Empirical evidence suggests that positive externalities from R&D exceed negative ones. 
According to conventional wisdom, this calls for R&D subsidies. This paper develops a 
quality-ladder growth model with overlapping generations which evaluates the positive and 
normative implications of R&D subsidies and compares them with the effects of public 
education policy to promote R&D. Unlike standard growth models, the proposed framework 
accounts for the specificity of science and engineering (S&E) skills, where individuals 
endogenously choose the type of education, and allows for heterogeneity in individual ability. 
Although intertemporal knowledge spillovers are hypothesized and negative R&D 
externalities are absent, the analysis shows somewhat surprisingly that R&D subsidies may be 
detrimental to both productivity growth and welfare, in contrast to publicly provided 
education targeted to S&E skills. Finally, the optimal structure of public education spending 
on different skills is examined. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
R&D-based models of economic growth have substantially contributed to our un-
derstanding of the interplay between ￿rms￿ incentives to invest in R&D, economic
growth and welfare. It has been pointed out that R&D may have positive as well
as negative externalities, leaving the question whether there is over- or underin-
vestment in R&D in decentralized equilibrium (compared to the social optimum)
theoretically ambiguous.1 By trying to shed light into this ambiguity, both empiri-
cal evidence as well as calibration exercises strongly suggest that the social return
to R&D signi￿cantly exceeds the private return to R&D (e.g., Jones and Williams,
1998, 2000; Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth, 2003). For instance, Jones and Williams
(1998), by linking R&D-based growth models to the productivity literature, argue
that ￿[a] conservative estimate indicates that optimal investment in research is more
than two to four times actual investment￿ (p.1134).
Such evidence has alarmed policy makers. For instance, the Barcelona European
Council 2002 has brought consensus among EU members ￿to increase the average
research investment level from 1. 9 %o fG D Pt o d a yt o3 %o fG D Pb y2 0 10, of which
2/3 should be funded by the private sector￿ (COM, 2003, p.3). In particular, the Eu-
ropean Commission seems to be ready to provide ￿rms with more ￿nancial incentives
to invest in R&D, arguing that ￿[p]ublic support is justi￿ed by the recognised failure
of the market to induce business investment in research at an optimal level￿ (COM,
2003, p.19). However, as pointed out by Romer (2000) in his informal discussion
about U.S. government policies to encourage R&D spending, ￿[f]ew participants in
1At least four externalities have been identi￿ed by the literature (see e.g. Jones, 2003). First,
innovators do not take into account that their R&D output may enhance capabilities of future
innovators, which has been called ￿standing on shoulders￿ or ￿intertemporal knowledge spillover￿
eﬀect, introduced by Romer (1990). Second, the equilibrium mark up which innovators can charge
for a new design may not coincide with the consumer surplus created by a new good, i.e., innovating
￿rms can appropriate only part of the surplus (Jones and Williams, 2000). These two distortions
promote underinvestment in R&D activities. Third, when new goods replace older goods, gains
from past innovating eﬀort is lost. This ￿business-stealing￿ eﬀect, introduced by Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), serves as a negative externality of R&D invest-
ments. Finally, overinvestment in R&D is also promoted by patent races, in which diﬀerent ￿rms
work on similar R&D projects in the hope to be the ￿r s tt ob ea s s i g n e dap a t e n tf o rt h e i ri n n o v a t i o n
(￿duplication externality￿).
1[the political debate surrounding demand-subsidy policies] seem to have considered
the broad range of alternative programs that could be considered￿ (pp.5-6). So the
question is not whether public policy should promote R&D but how to do it.
This paper contributes to this debate by comparing positive and normative ef-
fects of two alternative measures to foster R&D-based growth: (demand-side) R&D
subsidies and (supply-side) publicly provided education for scientists and engineers.
The theoretical innovation of the paper is to develop a quality-ladder growth model
with overlapping generations which rests on three elements. First, the model ac-
counts for the fact that R&D occupations require speci￿cs k i l l s ,w h i c hm a yd i ﬀer
substantially from skills applicable in non-R&D tasks. For instance, scientists or en-
gineers are not necessarily capable to perform (skill-intensive) non-R&D activities
like bookkeeping, machine operating or providing legal services, and vice versa. Sec-
ond, and related to this, individuals endogenously choose which skill type to acquire,
science and engineering (S&E) skills in order to be employed in R&D jobs, skills
applicable for production-related tasks, or to remain unskilled. That is, the analysis
distinguishes between skills which are crucial for improving productivity growth and
those applicable in the process of producing consumption goods. Moreover, it allows
for public education expenditure targeted to both types of skills. Third, individuals
are heterogeneous in their ability to perform R&D jobs when choosing to acquire
S&E skills, which re￿ects the notion that R&D activities require extraordinary tal-
ent.
The analysis shows that by accounting for these important features substantially
alters the positive and normative implications of R&D subsidies drawn from stan-
dard models.2 To highlight this point, the framework hypothesizes that intertem-
poral knowledge spillovers are the only (unambiguously positive) externality from
R&D. Clearly, in standard models of endogenous technological change which do not
2Growth theory has successfully integrated models in which R&D and human capital accumu-
lation are engines of growth by emphasizing the complementarity between these two factors for the
process of development (e.g., Redding, 1996; Arnold, 1998; Funke and Strulik, 2000; Strulik, 2004).
However, to the best of my knowledge, the implications of allowing for an endogenous formation
of speci￿c S&E skills for R&D-based growth have not been examined yet.
2allow for skill speci￿city and educational choice, this calls for positive R&D subsidies
to ￿rms in order to induce a reallocation of labor towards R&D activity. This result
critically depends on the assumption, however, that the (high-skilled) labor force is
capable to perform both R&D and production activities without having to adjust to
a change in occupation. One obvious drawback of this assumption is that labor sup-
ply of scientists and engineers is rather inelastic in the short-run, i.e., R&D subsidies
are absorbed by rising factor prices for R&D inputs, as discussed in Romer (2000),
among others. This paper not only con￿rms this view but also shows that even by
accounting for long-run supply responses, earnings of scientists and engineers rise
unambiguously. This result is driven by the heterogeneity of individuals in ability.
It is consistent with empirical evidence by Goolsbee (1998), who ￿nds that a 10
percent increase in government spending on R&D aﬀects both income and hourly
wages of scientists and engineers by 3 percent even in the longer run. Moreover, the
proposed theory suggests that R&D subsidies may reduce eﬀective aggregate supply
of S&E skills, and may be detrimental to both productivity growth and welfare.
That is, R&D policy targeted to demand may not foster innovative activity when
the speci￿city and endogeneity of the supply of S&E skills is taken into account.
Fortunately, the analysis suggests a sensible and straightforward alternative to
promote R&D-based growth: to target public R&D spending directly to the supply
of skills. First, a promotion of extraordinary S&E talent does not aﬀect the distri-
bution of earnings, which is in sharp contrast to the result that R&D subsidies to
￿rms foster earnings inequality. Moreover, and also in contrast to R&D subsidies,
education spending on S&E skills unambiguously raise productivity growth. Finally,
the normative analysis shows that the socially optimal structure of public education
expenditure to diﬀerent skills depends on the interaction between the relative eﬀec-
tiveness of the education system across skills and the eﬀectiveness of private-sector
R&D spending relative to the output elasticity of production skills.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model.
Section 3 derives both the short-run equilibrium and the equilibrium with full ed-
ucational adjustment to public policy measures (long-run). Section 4 studies the
3socially optimal policy design with respect to both R&D subsidies and the structure
of public education expenditure towards skills applicable in R&D and production
activities, respectively. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. All proofs are
relegated to an appendix.
2B a s i c M o d e l
Consider the following overlapping-generations economy, where each generation is
populated by L individuals.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals live for two periods. In the ￿rst period of life, individuals live with their
parents and decide (rationally and under perfect information) whether to specialize
in S&E skills (i.e., to work as scientist or engineer), to acquire skills applicable in
more routinized production processes, or to remain unskilled. Individuals have a unit
time endowment in the ￿rst period of life, devoted entirely to the acquisition of skills
and leisure. Acquiring S&E skills is necessary to perform R&D tasks and requires
zR ∈ (0,1) units of time, whereas acquiring production skills requires zS ∈ (0,1)
units of time. In the second period of life (adulthood), individuals supply their
skills inelastically to a perfect labor market. After specializing in, e.g., S&E skills,
an individual cannot work in routinized production, and vice versa.3 This re￿ects
the notion that, say, a lawyer or bookkeeper cannot do research on software and an
IT specialist cannot be employed as lawyer or bookkeeper. Individuals diﬀer in the
ability to perform R&D tasks after having acquired S&E skills, denoted by a.A s
will be speci￿ed in section 2.3, this is re￿ected by diﬀerences in eﬃciency units of
S&E skills possessed by R&D workers, after incurring zR units of time. In order to
focus the analysis on an ability type which is relevant for knowledge spillovers and
3In principle, the set up allows for the possibility that either type of skilled worker can be
employed (in the same occupations) as unskilled workers. However, as will become apparent, this
cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
4growth, this is the only source of individual heterogeneity in the model.4
Intertemporal preferences of an individual i born in t − 1 (i.e., a member i of
generation t−1)a r ed e ￿ned over leisure time in the ￿rst period of life, dt−1(i),a n d
consumption during adulthood (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 2003). The utility
function is speci￿ed as















σ > 1, is an index of diﬀerentiated goods (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977); ￿ xt(i,j) denotes
the quantity of good j ∈ [0,n t] consumed by member i of generation t−1 in period t.
The measure nt is referred to as the ￿number of products￿ in t.N o t et h a t ,a c c o r d i n g
to (2), individuals ￿love variety￿ in the sense that for any given total consumption
of diﬀerentiated goods, n￿ x, utility increases with n.
2.2 Firms
Each producer manufactures one variety of the diﬀerentiated goods in monopolistic








0 < α < 1. lS
t (j) and lU
t (j) denote eﬃciency units of skilled and unskilled production-
related labor employed in ￿rm j at date t, respectively, whereas xt(j) and At(j) are
output and total factor productivity of ￿rm j in t.
4This is not to deny that, for instance, there are productivity diﬀerences among students grad-
uating in law, but these skills do not seem to foster growth. For instance, Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) present empirical cross-country evidence that the fraction of students in engineering
￿elds (around 10 percent on average in their sample) is positively related to growth, whereas the
fraction of law students (around 9 percent on average) even adversely aﬀects growth.
5In each period t, ￿rm j can aﬀect productivity At(j) by employing scientists and
engineers.5 In line with growth theory based on in-house R&D (e.g., Young, 1998)
and the IO literature on innovation activities (e.g., Sutton, 1998), R&D outlays are
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t (j) denotes the eﬃciency units of R&D labor investments of ￿rm j in period

















0 < ε ≤ 1,r e ￿ects an intertemporal spillover eﬀect from previous investments of
￿rms in R&D, t ≥ 1,w h e r eﬂ S−1 > 0 is historically given.7 Note that, according
to (6), if each ￿rm chooses the same R&D investment, i.e., if lR
t−1(j)=lR
t−1 for all
j (which will be the case in equilibrium), then ﬂ St−1 = ﬂ St−2 (nt−1)
1−ε h(lR
t−1).T h u s ,
5An alternative formulation is that ￿rms have to incur R&D expenditure one period in advance
of production (￿nanced by borrowing), like in the (discrete-time) in￿nite-horizon growth model of
Young (1998). (See also Grossmann, 2003.) However, this assumption seems to be less plausible
in an OLG model. Rather, for simplicity (since irrelevant for the main arguments of this paper),
the analysis abstracts from savings and asset markets.
6Alternatively to the analysis of productivity-enhancing technological progress, one could








,w h e r eqt(j) is perceived quality of good j in t,a n dl e tAt(j)=A>0
for all j and t. Moreover, let quality qt(j),r a t h e rt h a nAt(j), evolve according to the right-hand
side of (4). It is easy to show that, under these modi￿cations, all results in this paper remain
exactly the same.
7Regarding intellectual property rights, (4) and (6) imply that innovations are proprietary
k n o w l e d g ef o ro n ep e r i o do n l y .
6if ε =1 ,t h e nﬂ St−1 is ceteris paribus independent on the number of ￿rms, nt−1.
This special case re￿ects the notion that innovations of ￿rms are ￿equivalent￿ in
the sense that ￿rms come up with similar solutions to similar problems at the same
time, having similar access to the state-of-the-art technologies (Young, 1998).8 In
contrast, allowing for ε < 1 implies that the number of innovating ￿rms in symmetric
equilibrium positively aﬀects future productivity growth.
There is free entry of ￿rms into the economy, with a large number of potential
entrants. At all times, ￿rms have to incur standard ￿xed cost f>0 in terms of
unskilled labor.9 Since f has to be incurred each period and the intertemporal
spillover eﬀect cannot be appropriated by ￿rms, the length of the planning horizon
of ￿r m si se x a c t l yo n ep e r i o d( Y o u n g ,1998).
2.3 Educational Production and Government Spending
To focus on the role of public education spending, educational production solely
depends on public expenditure for either type of education, development of S&E
skills or production skills, respectively.10 Denote public expenditure levels for S&E
skills and production skills of generation t − 1 by GR
t−1 and GS
t−1, respectively, and
the population share of either type of worker in period t (i.e., one period after
receiving education) by sR
t and sS





















8Consequently, as will become apparent, the speci￿cation ε =1eliminates the scale eﬀect from
population size L in the economy￿s growth rate.
9The main results from the analysis are unaﬀected if production would also require a ￿xed staﬀ
of skilled, non-R&D workers. However, the additional analytical complexity would be substantial,
and is avoided here for the sake of simplicity.
10It is straightforward to allow for certain forms of private human capital investments as well
without aﬀecting the main results of this study. One standard justi￿cation for public ￿nance of
education is the incapability of individuals to borrow for educational purposes. As a matter of
fact, public education systems are particularly prevalent in Continental Europe.
7respectively. Denote the set of individuals (of generation t−1) who supply S&E skills







St di.) An individual i ∈ Rt with ability a(i) acquires
e
R






eﬃciency units of R&D labor. For simplicity, suppose ability a is uniformly distrib-









eﬃciency units of production skills; ξ
k > 0, 0 < β
k ≤ 1, k = R,S. (Recall that
individuals only diﬀer in their ability to perform R&D tasks.) Note that individual
eﬃciency units of labor depend on per capita spending levels for education (gR,
gS), which re￿ects that publicly provided education is a rival good. Also note
that educational production is subject to diminishing returns when β
R,β
S < 1.I f
remaining unskilled, an individual owns one unit of unskilled labor (eU
t =1 ).
Recall that individuals inelastically supply their eﬃciency units during working
life. Let wR
t and wS
t denote the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of S&E skills and
production skills at date t, respectively. Unskilled labor is chosen as numeraire
(wU
t =1 ). Using (8) and (9), the nominal income (or earnings) level of a member i
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t denote aggregate supply of eﬃciency units of R&D labor,




0 are historically given.
At each t, besides ￿nancing education, the government may subsidize R&D
8spending of ￿rms at rate ￿t ∈ [0,1).F o r a n y t ≥ 1, ￿t is announced at least
one period in advance, which implies that members of generation t − 1 take ￿t
into account when choosing among educational ￿elds. Both education expenditure
and R&D subsidies are ￿nanced by a proportional income tax on workers, where
τt ∈ [0,1) denotes the tax rate at date t. The government budget is balanced each
period.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Equilibrium for Given Educational Choice
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1) and (2), utility maximization implies that the demand function


















is aggregate (nominal) expenditure for
￿nal consumption goods (which equals aggregate disposable income of generation


















i.e., for any individual i, the consumption index Ct(i) equals ￿real￿ disposable income











0 pt(i,j))xt(i,j))dj = It(i) yields demand
functions ￿ xD
t (i,j)) = (1 − τt)It(i)pt(j)−σ/
R nt
0 pt(j)1−σdj, j ∈ [0,n t].I n t e g r a t i n g o v e r a l l i and
observing (12) con￿rms (11).





t ≥ 0 (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), where ct(j) denotes marginal production cost,
which, according to (3) (and wU






Note that pro￿ts of ￿rm j in t can be written as
πt(j)=( pt(j) − ct(j))x
D




t (j) − f. (16)
Regarding the choice of eﬀective R&D labor, lR
t (j), the analysis exclusively focusses
on h(lR














t (j) − f
)
, (17)
where Γ ≡ αα(σ−1)(1−α)(1−α)(σ−1)(σ−1)σ−1/σσ > 0, t ≥ 0.N o t et h a t￿rms take ￿t,
wS
t , wR
t , Et and Pt as given. Hence, the ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice












t (j))ΓEt =( 1− ￿t)w
R
t . (18)
Condition (18) says that the marginal bene￿to fa ni n c r e a s ei nR & Dl a b o ri nt must
equal its marginal cost. Note that the latter is decreasing in ￿t, all other things equal,
implying that demand for scientists and engineers is increasing in the R&D subsidy
rate ￿t. Using (5), it is easy to show that for the second-order condition for a pro￿t
maximum to hold, 1 > γ(σ−1) is required, which is assumed throughout the paper.
Moreover, note that (18) implies lR
t (j)=lR
t , and thus, according to (4), At(j)=At







t for all j, i.e., there is symmetry in equilibrium. Thus,
besides conditions (14) and (18) from pro￿t maximization, the following equilibrium













t ,a n dntlS
t = LS
t (labor market clearing),
(E3) πt(j)=0for all j ∈ [0,n t], i.e., (pt −ct)xD
t =( 1−￿t)wR
t lR
t +f (free entry).
For given educational choices, the following equilibrium income levels result. (All
results are proven in Appendix.)



























where Ξ ≡ 1+( 1− α − γ)(σ − 1) > 0.13 Thus, for given educational choices,
IR
t (a(i)) is increasing in ￿t, whereas IS
t is independent of ￿t.B o t hIR
t (a(i)) and IS
t
are independent of Gk
t−1, k = R,S.
For given educational choices, an increase in government spending on education,
GR
t−1 or GS
t−1,h a st w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects on income levels of workers with S&E skills
and production skills from generation t − 1, respectively. First, observing (7), eﬃ-
ciency units per worker are enhanced, according to (8) and (9), respectively. This
raises income levels of skilled workers, according to (10), when holding wage rates
per eﬃciency unit, wR
t and wS
t , respectively, constant. Second, however, if Gk
t−1
increases, wage rate wk
t declines, k = R,S, due to an increase in the eﬀective ag-
gregate supply of the respective type of skills, LR
t .B o t he ﬀects exactly cancel under




13Ξ > 0 is implied by α < 1 together with assumption 1 > γ(σ − 1).
11in period t, ￿t, raises demand of ￿rms for S&E skills in t. For given educational
choices, this unambiguously raises wage rate wR
t , and thus, raises income levels of
scientists and engineers, according to (10).
Before analyzing the implications of Lemma 1 for educational choices, consider
the short-run impact of an increase in R&D subsidies, i.e., the impact of an increase
in ￿0 on the equilibrium in period 0.14 (GR
0 and GS
0 do not aﬀect the short-run equi-
librium since skills are supplied by individuals one period after receiving education.)
Proposition 1. (Short-run eﬀects). An increase in ￿0 raises wR
0 , and has no
impact on n0, wS
0 and A0 in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 implies that an increase in R&D subsidies to ￿rms, which is unan-
ticipated by individuals, merely serves as a windfall gain for individuals who happen
to possess S&E skills. Thus, inequality across educational groups is raised, without
aﬀecting net wage costs of ￿rms for R&D activity at all. Consequently, product
variety, marginal production costs and productivity (i.e., inventive activity) remain
unchanged, respectively. This result is an implication of the assumption that S&E
skills need time to develop, i.e., are in inelastic supply in the short-run, as has been
argued (informally) in the previous literature (Goolsbee, 1998; Romer, 2000).
However, what has not been explored yet in the theoretical literature are the
long-run eﬀects and policy implications associated with educational decisions under
skill speci￿city and heterogeneity in ability. This is done next.
3.2 Equilibrium with Endogenous Educational Choice
Substituting (13) into (1), using (10), and observing time requirements zR and zS
for the acquisition of skills, indirect life-time utility of individual i from generation
14Recall that, for the initially adult generation, eﬃciency units of all skill types are exogenously
given. Thus, the short-run analysis is equivalent to that of a policy change which is not anticipated
by individuals.
12t − 1, Vt−1(i),r e a d s
Vt−1(i)=

   
   






if i ∈ Rt,














t ≥ 1. Since individuals diﬀer only in the ability to perform R&D tasks after
acquiring S&E skills, in equilibrium, each production worker must be indiﬀerent
whether to acquire production skills or to remain unskilled. Thus, (1 − zS)IS
t =1 ,
a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 1). Moreover, (21) implies that individuals choose to become scientist
or engineer if (1 − zR)IR
t (a(i)) ≥ 1.S i n c eIR
t (a(i)) is increasing in a(i) (Lemma 1),
there exists a unique threshold ability level at each date t,d e n o t e d￿ at,w h i c hi s
given by (1 − zR)IR
t (￿ at)=1 .15 Consequently, for any t ≥ 1, the set of individuals
who acquire S&E skills is given by Rt = {i|a(i) ≥ ￿ at}. Recalling that ability a is







￿ at da =
1 − ￿ at, t ≥ 1. The following proposition summarizes these results and states, in
addition, how educational shares sR
t , sS
t and sU
t , and equilibrium income levels of
scientists and engineers, IR
t (a(i)), depend on public policy, ￿t, GR
t−1 and GS
t−1.




1 − zS¢−1 > 1;









Θ ≡ 1+( 1− γ − zSα)(σ − 1) > 0,16 such that all members of generation t− 1 with
a(i) ≥ ￿ at become R&D workers;
(c) ￿ at = a∗(￿t) is decreasing in ￿t,a n dt h u s ,sR
t =1− ￿ at is increasing in ￿t;
15Educational choices do neither depend on the income tax rate, τt, nor on the price index,
Pt. Thus, the analysis abstracts from distortions of educational decisions through income taxation
which would arise from, say, a progressive tax system.
16Θ > 0 is implied by α < 1, zS < 1 and γ(σ − 1) < 1.
13moreover, both ￿ at and sR
t are independent of Gk
t−1, k = R,S;
(d) both sS
t and sU
t are decreasing in ￿t and independent of Gk
t−1, k = R,S;





(1 − zR)￿ at
. (23)
Thus, for all a(i) ∈ (￿ at,1], IR
t (a(i)) is increasing in ￿t and independent of Gk
t−1,
k = R,S.
Comparative-static results in Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. Since
changes in public education spending, GR
t−1 or GS
t−1, have no impact on income levels
for given educational choices of generation t−1, according to Lemma 1,t h e yd on o t
aﬀect educational choices. In contrast, an increase in the R&D subsidy rate, ￿t,b y
raising demand for R&D labor, has a positive impact on the fraction of scientists
and engineers in the population, sR
t , and thus, a negative impact on both sS
t and
sU
t . Moreover, note that the additional supply of scientists or engineers induced by
an increase in ￿t stems from workers with mediocre abilities. Thus, implementing a
R&D subsidy raises labor income for all individuals who would become researchers
even if ￿t =0 . In other words, an increase in ￿t raises the return to ability, i.e.,
income IR
t (a(i)) is increasing in ￿t whenever a(i) > ￿ at, despite an increase in the
supply of workers who acquire S&E skills, sR
t L.17 (Recall that sRL is the total
number of R&D workers, which has to be distinguished from the eﬀective aggregate
supply of S&E skills, LR = L
R 1
a∗ eR(a)da.)
To illustrate the latter point in more detail, consider the impact of an increase
in ￿t on two inequality measures: ￿rst, on earnings inequality within the group
of R&D workers, and second, on inequality between R&D labor and production
workers. As income of R&D workers is proportional to ability and ability is uni-
formly distributed, it is appropriate to de￿ne a measure of within-group inequal-
ity in period t, denoted σR
t , as ratio of the top to bottom earners within this
17This eﬀect is similar to one derived in Galor and Moav (2000) in a diﬀerent context in which an
increase in technological progress raises the return to innate (and heterogeneous) cognitive ability.
In contrast to their analysis, however, in the present context high-ability individuals gain from a




t (￿ at).T h u s , σR
t =1 /￿ at, according to (23). More-
over, between-group inequality, denoted σ
R/P
t ,i sd e ￿ned as ratio of average income






















t ≡ ﬂ IR
t /ﬂ IP
t . The following result arises.




creasing in ￿t,a n di n d e p e n d e n to f Gk
t−1, k = R,S.
Thus, even if R&D subsidies are fully taken into account by individuals in their
educational choice, R&D subsidies are positively related to income inequality accord-
ing to both measures, within-group and between-group inequality. Note that this
result does not hinge on a weak short-run supply elasticity of S&E skills (compare
with Proposition 1). Rather it is an implication of the heterogeneity in ability. This
is a novel aspect in the literature on R&D subsidies. In contrast, public provision of
education of either kind does not aﬀect earnings inequality, according to Proposition
3. Hence, whether public policy addresses demand or supply of S&E skills has very
diﬀerent distributional eﬀects. Whereas the analysis suggests that public provision
of education may be neutral to inequality, R&D subsidies to ￿rms are not. As will
become apparent, public education expenditure on scientists and engineers also fos-
ters growth unambiguously, i.e., there is no trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency
with respect to this policy measure.
The remainder of this section provides comparative-static results regarding the
relationship of policy variables to the equilibrium number of ￿rms, nt,e ﬃciency units
of S&E skills supplied in total and employed per ￿rm, LR
t and lR
t , respectively, and
t h ew a g er a t e( p e re ﬃciency unit) of skilled production labor, wS
t ,f o rt ≥ 1.N o t e
that a change in nt aﬀects both product variety in the economy and, if ε < 1,a l s o
intertemporal R&D externalities, ﬂ St−1 (see the discussion in section 2.2). Moreover,
recall that lR
t = LR
t /nt is positively related to productivity At, according to (4), and
thus, like wS
t ,a d v e r s e l ya ﬀects prices, pt,a c c o r d i n gt o( 14) and (15). The following
18A similar measure has been applied by Galor and Moav (2000), who also assume a uniform
ability distribution. Ability has a diﬀerent interpretation in their model, however.
15results will also play an important role for understanding the socially optimal policy
design analyzed in the next section.
Lemma 2. For any t ≥ 1, the following holds in equilibrium.
nt =


























(1 + 1/a∗(￿t))(1 − a∗(￿t))1−βR
















Thus, an increase in ￿t reduces both nt and wS
t ,a n dr a i s e slR
t ; the impact of an
increase in ￿t on LR
t is generally ambiguous, but negative if β
R =1 . Moreover, an
increase in GR
t−1 raises both LR
t and lR
t , but has no impact on nt or wS
t .F i n a l l y ,
an increase in GS
t−1 lowers wS
t , but has no impact on nt, LR
t or lR
t .
For the intuition of the impact of a change in ￿t on the variables in (24)-(27),
￿rst, recall from Proposition 1 that for given educational choices, R&D costs of
￿rms and thus the number of ￿rms are unaﬀected by R&D subsidies. Also recall
from part (iii) of Proposition 2 that an increase in the R&D subsidy rate, ￿t,r a i s e s
the incentive for individuals with mediocre abilities to acquire S&E skills, i.e., ￿ at
declines. In view of the previous remark that nt is unaﬀected by a change in ￿t for
a given fraction sR
t of scientists and engineers in the labor force, this shift in the
employment structure away from production activities lowers pro￿ts of ￿rms due
to a reduction in output, all other things equal. Thus, an increase in ￿t adversely
aﬀects the equilibrium number of ￿rms, n∗. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly
at the ￿rst glance, total supply of eﬀective R&D labor, LR∗, may decrease with ￿t
(e.g., if β
R =1 ), despite the fact that a larger fraction sR
t of individuals chooses
e d u c a t i o ni naS & E￿eld. This is because public education is a rival good, i.e., given
16total education spending, eﬀective labor per head is decreasing if more individuals
acquire education. Thus, an increase in sR
t t r i g g e r e db ya ni n c r e a s ei n￿t exerts
a negative externality on eﬀective R&D labor per head, according to (7) and (8).
This demonstrates that R&D subsidies may be a rather ineﬀective way to stimulate
R&D activity. The analysis also suggests that the primary policy goal should not
necessarily be to raise the fraction of scientists and engineers in the population,19
but to promote the skill development of the best talents, i.e., to emphasize excellence
in the education system.
D u et ot h ed e c l i n ei nt h en u m b e ro f￿rms, eﬃciency units of S&E skills per ￿rm,
lR∗, nevertheless increase unambiguously with ￿t. Moreover, due to the rivalry of
public education expenditure, since less individuals choose to acquire production
skills when ￿t increases, for any level GS
t−1, per capita spending for production
skills, gS
t−1,r i s e s . T h u s ,e ﬀective supply of production skills per worker increases.
Consequently, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of production skills (relative to the
wage rate of the unskilled), wS
t , declines when ￿t increases.
To understand the eﬀects of changes in educational spending, recall from parts
(iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2 that an increase in public education expenditure of
either kind, GR
t−1 or GS
t−1, leaves population shares, sR
t , sS
t and sU
t , unchanged. Thus,
an increase in GR
t−1 does not aﬀect n∗ or wS∗,b u tr a i s e se ﬀective R&D labor in total
and per ￿rm, LR∗ and lR∗, respectively. In contrast, since an increase in GS
t−1 raises
eﬀective labor supply of skilled production workers, it lowers wS∗, without aﬀecting
n∗, LR∗ or lR∗.
Note from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 that the economy is in its steady state
from period 1 onwards if public policy does not change over time, i.e., if
￿t =ﬂ ￿, G
R
t = ﬂ G
R, and G
S
t = ﬂ G
S for all t ≥ 1. (28)
19To avoid misunderstandings, this presumes that there are no obstacles to attract the best
talents to S&E ￿elds. For instance, a much discussed policy debate are gender-speci￿c attitudes to
S&E ￿elds in particular and problems to attract ethnic minorities to tertiary education in general
(see e.g. European Commission, 2003). The analysis has nothing to say about such important
issues, which should be tackled by future research.
17The next result analyzes the eﬀects of public policy for the rate of productivity
growth, ϑt+1 ≡ At+1/At − 1.












γ − 1. (29)
Thus, for all t ≥ 0,a ni n c r e a s ei nﬂ ￿ unambiguously raises ϑt+1 if ε =1 , whereas,
for t ≥ 1, the impact of an increase in ﬂ ￿ on ϑt+1 is generally ambiguous if ε < 1.
Moreover, for all t ≥ 1,a ni n c r e a s ei nGR
t positively aﬀects ϑt+1,w h e r e a sϑt+1 is
independent of GS
t .
Let us start with the relationship between R&D subsidies and productivity
growth. Recall from the discussion in section 2.2 that, if ε < 1,t h en u m b e ro f
innovating ￿rms, n, positively aﬀects knowledge spillovers in symmetric equilibrium
(which is prevalent in the model), all other things equal. Thus, under (28), if ε < 1,
an increase in ﬂ ￿ (which is foreseen by individuals when making educational choices)
has two opposing eﬀects on productivity growth, ϑt+1, t ≥ 1.F i r s t ,i tr a i s e se ﬀective
R&D labor per ￿rm, lR∗, according to Lemma 2. Second, however, it reduces the
number of innovating ￿rms, n∗, which has a negative eﬀect on knowledge spillovers.
If ε =1 , all innovations are equivalent in the sense that the number of innovating
￿rms does not matter for knowledge spillovers, i.e., the second eﬀect vanishes.20
Thus, only in this case, productivity growth is unambiguously fostered by R&D
subsidies.21
20According to (29), the growth rate in period 1, ϑ1, is unambiguously increasing in ﬂ ￿ also if
ε < 1.
21Although ε =1seems to be a knife-edge case, one should note that it has a desirable property
of removing ￿scale eﬀects￿ regarding growth, holding per capita spending on S&E skills, GR/L,
constant. That is, according to (24) and (26), productivity growth does not depend on population
size L if ε =1 . (However, it is easy to see that even in the case ε =1 ,t h e r ea r es c a l ee ﬀects
regarding the level of productivity At, and thus, regarding the level of output, respectively. See
Jones (1999) for a discussion of this property of so-called non-scale models of endogenous growth.)
18Next, let us discuss the implications of public education policy for productivity
growth. Recall from Lemma 2 that public education spending of either kind is
unrelated to the number of ￿rms, and thus does not aﬀect intertemporal R&D
externalities. Also note that public spending on S&E skills, unlike educational
spending on production skills, aﬀects innovative activity per ￿r m .T h i se x p l a i n sw h y
educational spending on scientists and engineers but not on other skilled workers is
positively related to productivity growth.22 Public education targeted to production
skills aﬀects welfare, however, as will become apparent in the following.
4N o r m a t i v e A n a l y s i s
This section examines implications of the positive analysis on both the desirability
of R&D subsidies and the optimal structure of public education expenditure from a
normative point of view.
First, consider the public ￿nance side of policy measures, which relates policy
variables to the required income tax rates under a balanced government budget.
































t ,￿ t). (31)
In contrast, if ε < 1, productivity growth is increasing in L (again, holding GR/L constant).
Empirical evidence on the presence of scale eﬀects regarding the long-run growth rate is, however,
weak and inconclusive (for a comprehensive survey, see e.g. Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999).
That is, scale eﬀects, although seemingly playing a major role in historical growth paths (Kremer,
1993), have been severely questioned for the post-war period (e.g., Jones, 1995, 2003). This does
not necessarily mean, however, that ε =1is the empirically relevant case, although it may mean
that the model is not fully appropriate to deal with the scale eﬀect problem which is prevalent in
many models of endogenous technical change.
22As argued in an earlier note, this property is well-supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Mur-
phy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).
19Thus, for all t ≥ 0, τt is increasing in ￿t and Gk
t, k = R,S.23
Welfare of the initially old generation may be represented by some function
f(τ0,￿ 0), which negatively depends on the income tax rate, τ0 =￿ τ0(GR
0 ,G S
0,￿ 0),
and, possibly, positively depends on the initial R&D subsidy, ￿0 (because it raises
income levels of scientists and engineers, according to Proposition 1). Moreover, to
ensure an interior solution with respect to the socially optimal choice of Gk
0, k = R,S,
suppose ∂2f/∂(τ0)2 ≤ 0. The function f depends, in addition to a speci￿cation of
social welfare for this generation, on the allocation of skills across adult individuals
in the initial period, which has not been speci￿ed yet. An explicit derivation of f
from such speci￿cations would not yield further insights for the optimal policy mix,
however, and is therefore left out.
First, recall that ￿0 plays no role for subsequent generations (i.e., does not trigger
intertemporal knowledge spillovers), and merely aﬀects the income distribution of
the initially old generation, according to Proposition 1. Thus, if the social planner
has no preference for windfall gains of R&D workers (in the initial period), we have
￿0 =0in social optimum.24
For the sake of concreteness, suppose that the social planner maximizes the
discounted sum of welfare of each generation. Moreover, let us employ an utilitarian
welfare function for each generation. The social welfare function is then given by








where ρ ∈ (0,1) is the time preference rate of the social planer.25 (Recall that Vt−1(i)
is indirect utility of member i of generation t − 1.)
Due to the lack of transitional dynamics in the model, the social planning prob-
23Recall that Ξ and Θ are unessential, positive constants.
24Formally, this is true if ∂f(τ0,￿ 0)/∂τ0|τ0=￿ τ0•∂￿ τ0/∂￿0+∂f(￿ τ0,￿ 0)/∂￿0 ≤ 0 for all (GR
0 ,G S
0,￿ 0)
such that ￿ τ0(GR
0 ,G S
0,￿ 0) < 1. (Note that ∂￿ τ0/∂￿0 > 0, according to Lemma 3, and recall
assumptions ∂f/∂τ0 < 0 and ∂f/∂￿0 ≥ 0.)
25Discounting of future generations may be normatively justi￿ed by the presence of positive
productivity growth.
20lem entails that (28) holds, i.e., policy variables are time-invariant for t ≥ 1.26 The
socially optimal R&D policy, given constraint ﬂ ￿ ≥ 0 (a non-negative R&D subsidy
rate is imposed in order to allow for a well-de￿ned corner solution of the social
planning problem), can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 5. (Optimal R&D subsidy). For all t ≥ 1, the socially optimal
R&D subsidy rate may be given by ￿t =ﬂ ￿ =0 . Provision of R&D subsidies is ￿more
likely￿ to be detrimental to social welfare, the lower ε or β
S,a n dt h eh i g h e rβ
R,b u t
ﬂ ￿ =0may also be optimal if ε =1 .
According to Proposition 5, although a positive intertemporal spillover eﬀect is
the only externality from R&D, it may well be the case that providing R&D subsidies
is harmful. To gain intuition for this result, recall that, for any t ≥ 1,a ni n c r e a s ei n
￿t =ﬂ ￿ lowers the number of ￿rms and products, nt = n∗(ﬂ ￿), according to Lemma
2. This has two adverse eﬀects on social welfare. First, except for the initially old
generation, utility of all individuals declines due to the love-of-variety property of
preferences. Second, if ε < 1, steady state productivity growth (driven by knowledge
spillovers) may slow down when ﬂ ￿ increases, according to Proposition 4, even though
S&E skills employed per ￿rm rise unambiguously. This eﬀect is more likely to be
negative, the lower ε is. However, even if an increase in ﬂ ￿ unambiguously raises
productivity growth (i.e., if ε =1 ), it is optimal not to provide a demand-stimulus
to R&D under plausible parameter con￿gurations (for an example, see the proof of
Proposition 5 in Appendix).
Also β
R and β
S, which may be interpreted as the eﬀectiveness of public education
expenditure for the development of S&E skills and production skills, according to (8)
and (9), respectively, systematically aﬀect the socially optimal R&D subsidy. First,
recall that an anticipated increase in ￿t raises the employment share of scientists
and engineers, sR
t , and lowers the employment share of skilled production workers,
sS
t , according to parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2, respectively. Thus, since
education is a rival good, for any level GS
t−1,t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of ￿t on utility
26Thus, for t ≥ 1, τt is time-invariant, according to (31).
21through a reduction in sS
t and thus in wS∗ (which lowers marginal production costs)
is strengthened by an increase in β
S. In contrast, for any level GR
t−1,t h ep o s i t i v e
eﬀect of ￿t on utility through an increase in sR
t and thus in lR∗ is weakened by an
increase in β
R.27
Proposition 6. (Optimal structure of public education). The socially optimal

















(b) For all t ≥ 0, for a given policy to subsidize R&D, GR
t (GS
t )i si n c r e a s i n g
(decreasing) in β
R, and decreasing (increasing) in β
S; moreover, both GR
t and GS
t
are independent of ε, ξ
R and ξ
S.
According to Proposition 6 (a), for all t ≥ 0, the socially optimal structure of
education spending, GR
t /GS
t , positively depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of the
education technology, β
R/β
S,a n dt h ee ﬀectiveness of R&D relative to the output
elasticity of production skills, γ/α. Moreover, the educational production tech-
nology and technologies of ￿rms to produce innovations and output, respectively,
interact: the higher the relative eﬀectiveness of R&D, γ/α, the higher the impact of
an increase in the relative eﬀectiveness of the education technology, β
R/β
S,o nt h e
optimal relative education spending on S&E skills, GR
t /GS
t ,a n dv i c ev e r s a . 28
According to Proposition 6 (b), expenditure levels for each type of skills posi-
tively depend on the eﬀectiveness of developing this type of skills in the education
27If one would allow for diﬀerent weights attached to low-ability and high-ability individuals
in the social welfare function, one can show that the introduction of a R&D subsidy is more
likely to harm social welfare, the lower social preferences for high-ability types. This is because
R&D subsidies aﬀect long-run income inequality by favoring high-ability individuals, according
to Proposition 3. Thus, in this sense, also distributional concerns greatly matter for the socially
optimal policy design to promote R&D.
28A c c o r d i n gt o( 3 3 ) ,f o rt ≥ 1, GR
t /GS
t = ﬂ GR/ ﬂ GS is also increasing in the time preference
parameter ρ. If the social planner discounts the future to a lesser degree (i.e., if ρ increases),
then the knowledge spillover becomes more important for intertemporal welfare. As a result, the
optimal education structure shifts towards S&E skills.
22technology and are adversely related to the eﬀectiveness of developing the other
skill type. Moreover, since public education policy does not aﬀect the equilibrium
number of ￿rms, a change in ε, which is critical for knowledge spillovers, has no
impact on the optimal public education policy. Finally, educational productivity
parameters ξ
R and ξ
S in (8) and (9), respectively, neither play a role for the struc-
ture nor for the level of the socially optimal education expenditure. Increases in ξ
R
or ξ
S leave the elasticity of eﬀective labor with respect to per capita spending levels
on education, gR or gS, respectively, unchanged, and thus do not alter the optimal
education policy.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The question how to promote R&D activity in order to enhance productivity growth
is at the center of public policy debates. Almost a third of R&D expenditure in the
OECD is ￿nanced by the government sector, e.g., through grants, project funding or
tax incentives (OECD, 1999). At present, the EU is planning an initiative to further
raise ￿nancial incentives to R&D performing ￿rms over the next years signi￿cantly
(COM, 2003). Indeed, empirical studies have frequently estimated positive and quite
sizable eﬀects of government support to business R&D. For instance, in a survey ar-
ticle on the eﬀectiveness of ￿scal incentives for R&D, Hall and van Reenen (2000,
p.462) argue that ￿work using US ￿rm-level data all reaches the same conclusion:
the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending during the 1980s is on the order of
unity￿.29 However, as pointed out by Goolsbee (1998, p.298), ￿[w]hen the govern-
ment increases R&D spending through subsidies or direct provision, a signi￿cant
fraction of the increased spending goes directly into higher wages, an increase in
the price rather than the quantity of inventive activity￿. Remarkably, this empirical
29Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003) show that the impact of an increase in public expenditure on
business R&D expenditure (using data from 17O E C Dc o u n t r i e sf o rt h e1983-96 period) is positive
also in the aggregate. Moreover, their evidence suggests that an increased incentive in direct
government funding reduces the eﬀect of tax incentives and vice versa, showing that diﬀerent
demand-side policies to R&D are substitutes to each other.
23￿nding does not only hold in the short-run but also in the longer-run.30 Indeed,
R&D capital expenditure typically accounts for only 10-13 percent of business R&D
(e.g., Hall and van Reenen, 2000), so it is fair to say that demand-side R&D policy
has mainly to be evaluated on the basis whether or not it stimulates employment of
S&E skills.
By assuming that a given (high-skilled) labor force can be allocated freely be-
tween production-related activities and R&D tasks, standard R&D-based growth
models have given a de￿nite answer to the question whether R&D subsidies are de-
sirable: Whenever positive externalities from R&D exceed the negative ones, R&D-
performing ￿rms should be subsidized. However, this literature has not taken into
account the speci￿city of S&E skills and the heterogeneity of individual ability, where
ability determines educational choice. By allowing for these elements, the analysis
predicts that, even in the long-run, R&D subsidies raise labor income inequality
across groups of R&D and production workers and within the group of scientists
and engineers. This is because R&D subsidies raise the return to ability of scientists
and engineers except for the marginal entrant in a S&E ￿eld. Moreover, due to the
rivalry of education expenditure, eﬀective aggregate supply of S&E skills may not
increase in response to higher R&D subsidies. If innovations are non-equivalent,
this implies that productivity growth may slow down. In addition, R&D subsidies
may be detrimental to welfare by fostering concentration, even though knowledge
spillovers are the only (and positive) R&D externality in the model.31
As an alternative measure to promote R&D, an increase in public expenditure
30These distributional eﬀects may be quite substantial even at the macro level. In 1999, the U.S.
workforce included about 3.5 million individuals employed in S&E occupations, where almost 2.26
million were employed in private, for-pro￿t industries (National Science Board, 2002, Appendix
table 3-12). An additional 3.35 million people whose highest degree is in a S&E ￿eld but who are
classi￿ed as holding non-S&E occupations indicate that their job is closely or somewhat related to
the ￿eld of their highest S&E degree (National Science Board, 2002, table 3-2). In total, around
11 million people in the U.S. graduated in a S&E ￿eld.
31One may argue that this potentially negative relationship of R&D subsidies to welfare is a
consequence of the modeling strategy to take labor as only input of the R&D technology. However,
if anything, this argument calls for a special subsidy on R&D equipment, which accounts for a
comparatively low fraction of total R&D costs, rather than for a general subsidy on R&D spending
(Romer, 2000).
24targeted to the education of scientists and engineers neither aﬀects the income dis-
tribution nor concentration in the economy, but unambiguously raises productivity
growth. That is, because R&D activity primarily requires human resources with spe-
cialized skills, government policy should try to support the best talents by providing
a high-standard S&E education. Interestingly, the widely-recognized ￿Sapir-Report￿
of a group of top economists on growth-promoting policies for Europe (on the ini-
tiative of the President of the European Commission) recommends a ￿substantial
increase in government and EU spending for [...] postgraduate education, but at the
same time putting the main emphasis on excellence when allocating the new addi-
tional funds￿ (Sapir et al., 2004, p.134; italics original). The analysis has given
a theoretical foundation to this policy prescription; ￿rst, by pointing out that the
often heard distributional concern to an education system which aims at promoting
excellence in ability of students and researchers is mistaken, and second, by showing
that such a policy will unambiguously boost eﬃciency and growth. Moreover, the
analysis has accounted for the welfare-enhancing eﬀects of public education targeted
to non-S&E ￿elds as well. The optimal structure of public education spending to-
wards diﬀerent skills depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of the education sector
across ￿elds and its interaction with the technological characteristics of ￿rms￿ R&D
and production activity.
The analysis also suggests to reconsider the policy-mix of public expenditure to
promote growth. Even if R&D subsidies were socially desirable due to a potential
rise in S&E skills, awareness and credibility of future public support for business
R&D has to be enhanced in order to attract students to S&E ￿elds.32 Otherwise,
the dismal short-run eﬀect identi￿ed in the analysis could be prevalent for quite a
long period. Thus, by and large, supporting supply of S&E skills directly over the
education system rather than indirectly through demand-side policies seems to be
preferable.
32Evidence by Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003) suggests that both direct public funding of R&D
and ￿scal incentives are more eﬀective in raising private R&D expenditure when their provision is
more stable over time.
25However, by focussing on spending levels for the development of speci￿c skills,
the analysis has just scratched the surface on how to improve the education system
in order to enhance growth and welfare. For instance, the analysis has neglected
the apparent cyclicity and uncertainty of private-sector demand for scientists and
engineers (De Hek, 1999; De Hek and Santanu, 2001), which may give a disincentive
to enter S&E ￿elds. Moreover, the analysis has not addressed the concerns related
to gender-speci￿c attitudes to S&E education and failures in primary and secondary
l e v e ls c h o o ls y s t e m sw h i c hl e a dt oa ni n s u ﬃcient attraction of the best talents to
higher-level education in general and S&E ￿elds in particular (e.g., European Com-
mission, 2003). The consequences of these issues for public policy measures towards
R&D-based growth are left for future research.
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t )α⁄σ−1 ΓEt in symmetric equilibrium (see (17)), (18) implies
(pt − ct)x
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for any t ≥ 0 in symmetric equilibrium. Combining (A.1)w i t ht h ef r e ee n t r y







(1 − ￿t)[1− γ(σ − 1)]
. (A.2)
Note that pt − ct = ct/(σ − 1) in symmetric equilibrium, according to (14). Thus,









1 − γ(σ − 1)
. (A.3)
26Moreover, according to (3), the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of skilled labor in
















(1 − α)f(σ − 1)
1 − γ(σ − 1)
(A.5)
for any t ≥ 0. Substituting (A.5) into the labor market clearing condition (E2) for
unskilled labor, we ￿nd that, for any t ≥ 0,t h en u m b e ro f￿r m si sg i v e nb y
nt =
LU
t [1 − γ(σ − 1)]
fΞ
, (A.6)
where Ξ =1+( 1− α − γ)(σ − 1) has been used. Consequently, combining (A.6)







t [1 − γ(σ − 1)]
. (A.7)
For k = R, substituting (A.7) into (A.2) implies that, for t ≥ 0, the wage rate per













































for the total eﬃciency units of skilled production labor. Total supply of unskilled



































Finally, substituting (A.13) and (A.14) into (10) con￿rms (19) and (20), respectively.
Comparative-static results immediately follow. This concludes the proof. ⁄
Proof of Proposition 1. The results regarding the impact of an increase in ￿0
on n0, wR
0 and wS




0 are exogenous.) Moreover, note that, in equilibrium
(which is symmetric), A0 = ﬂ S−1h(lR
0 )=ﬂ S−1(lR
0 )γ, according to (4) and (5). Using
lR
0 = LR
0 /n0 from (E2), and recalling that S−1 is exogenously given, concludes the
proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Part (a) follows from equilibrium condition (1 −
zS)IS
t =1 . To prove part (b), ￿rst, combine (20) and IS
t =( 1− zS)−1,a n du s e





(1 − zS)α(σ − 1)￿ at
Θ
, (A.15)
where Θ =1 + ( 1 −γ−zSα)(σ−1) has been used. (Also recall Ξ =1 + ( 1 −α−γ)(σ−1),
































1 − (￿ at)
2. (A.18)
Thus, combining (A.18) with equilibrium condition (1−zR)IR
t (￿ at)=1and rearrang-
ing terms con￿rms part (b). Part (c) follows from (22) and the fact that sR
t =1−￿ at.
Moreover, according to (A.15) and (A.16), respectively, both sS
t and sU
t are decreas-
ing in ￿t and independent of Gk
t−1 for k = R,S, t ≥ 1.T h i s c o n ￿rms part (d).
Finally, substituting (22) into (A.18) con￿rms (23). Thus, using the fact that ￿ at is
decreasing in ￿t proves part (e). This concludes the proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .The result that σR =1 /￿ at increases in ￿t immediately
follows from part (c) of Proposition 2. For the impact of an increase of ￿t on
σ
R/P
t = ﬂ IR
t /ﬂ IP















1 − zS¢−1 (see part (a) of Proposition 2) and sS
t /sU
t =( 1 −zS)α(σ−1)/Ξ,
according to (A.15) and (A.16), ﬂ IP
t is independent of policy parameters ￿t, GR
t−1 and
GS
t−1. Substituting both (23) and sR
t =1− ￿ at into the expression for the average
income of scientists and engineers, ﬂ IR

















t ,a n dt h u s ,σ
R/P
t = ﬂ IR
t /ﬂ IP
t are increasing in ￿t, according to part (iii) of
Proposition 2. This concludes the proof. ⁄
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that, for any t ≥ 1, LU
t = LΞ￿ at/Θ in equilibrium,
a c c o r d i n gt o( A . 12) and (A.16). Substituting this into (A.6) and using ￿ at = a∗(￿t)
from (22) con￿rms (24). To prove (26), ￿rst, recall that gR
t−1 = GR
t−1/(sR
t L), t ≥ 1,
according to (7). Substituting this and (A.17) into (A.10) and recalling both sR
t =
1−￿ at and ￿ at = a∗(￿t) for all t ≥ 1,c o n ￿rms (25). Thus, using lR
t = LR
t /nt from (E2),
(26) follows from (24) and (25). To prove (27), substitute gS
t−1 = GS
t−1/(sS
t L) from (7)
into (A.14), and use (A.15) and (A.16). Comparative static results are obtained from
(24)-(27) together with the facts that ∂￿ at/∂￿t < 0 and ∂￿ at/∂Gk
t−1 =0 , k = R,S,
according to part (iii) of Proposition 2. (For the impact of an increase in ￿t on LR
t
if β




R =1 , according to (25).) This
concludes the proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Using (4) and (6), it is straightforward to show that
A1 = ﬂ S0(l
R
1 )
γ and, for t ≥ 2,A t = ﬂ S0(nt−1 • ... • n1)
1−ε(l
R




where ﬂ S0 = ﬂ S−1 (n0)
1−ε (lR
0 )γ, according to (4), (5) and the symmetry of equilibrium.
Thus, ﬂ S0 is exogenously given (see (A.6) and the proof of Proposition 1). Also
recall A0 = ﬂ S−1(lR
0 )γ.T h u s , A1/A0 =( n0)
1−ε (lR
1 )γ and, for all t ≥ 1, At+1/At =
(nt)
1−ε (lR
t+1)γ. Using (24) and (26) con￿rms the results. ⁄
















t is aggregate (nominal) income. Using (A.8) and

























Setting t =0 ,( A . 2 3 )c o n ￿rms (30). To con￿rm (31), substitute LU
t = LsU
t ,w h e r esU
t
is given by (A.16), into (A.23). Comparative static results regarding Gk
t, k = R,S,
t ≥ 0, are obvious. Regarding the impact of an increase in ￿0 on τ0,i ti se a s y
to show from (30) that ∂τ0/∂￿0 > 0 if and only if τ0 < 1 (which, of course, is
presumed). Moreover, using the fact (a∗)0(￿t) < 0 (part (iii) of Proposition 2), it is
straightforward to show that, for any t ≥ 1,( 3 1) implies ∂τt/∂￿t > 0 if (but not
only if) τt < 1. This concludes the proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . First, social welfare is derived as function of policy
variables. Substituting both IS
t =
¡






ln(1 − τt) − lnPt +l n ( a(i)/￿ at) if i ∈ Rt,
ln(1 − τt) − lnPt otherwise.
(A.25)
Moreover, making use of the symmetry of equilibrium, (12) implies Pt =( nt)
1
1−σ pt.






t +l nAt − κ (A.26)
where κ ≡ ln
£
α−α(1 − α)−(1−α)σ/(σ − 1)
⁄
. Substituting (A.25) into (32), and using
(A.26), social welfare can be written as



















31Recall τ0 =￿ τ0(GR
0 ,G S
0,￿ 0) and, for t ≥ 1, τt =￿ τ(GR
t ,G S
t ,￿ t), from (30) and
(31), respectively. Thus, substituting (A.24), (22), (24), (26) and (27) into (A.27),
observing (28), and making use of
P∞
t=1 ρt = ρ/(1 − ρ) and
P∞
t=1 ρtt = ρ/(1 − ρ)2,
which are straightforward to verify, yields































0,￿ 0, ﬂ G
R, ﬂ G
S, ﬂ ￿), (A.29)















R ln ﬂ GR
1 − ρ
+ αβ






























Note that W∗ is strictly concave as function of Gk
0, k = R,S,a n d∂2W∗/∂GR
0 ∂GS
0 =
0, according to (A.29), (30) and assumption ∂2f/∂ (τ0)
2 ≤ 0. Similarly, note that
W ∗ is strictly concave as function of ﬂ Gk, k = R,S,a n d∂2W ∗/∂ ﬂ GR∂ ﬂ GS =0 ,a c -
c o r d i n gt o( A . 3 0 )a n d( 3 1). A social planner maximizes W ∗(•) with respect to
(GR
0 ,G S
0,￿ 0, ﬂ GR, ﬂ GS, ﬂ ￿). (Regarding ￿0, the socially optimal solution has been dis-
cussed in the beginning of section 5.)
Next, verify from (A.28) that F0(￿ at)=1− 1/￿ at < 0.T h u s ,a c c o r d i n gt o( A . 3 0 ) ,
∂Q
































Note that ∂￿ τ/∂ﬂ ￿<0 and (a∗)0(ﬂ ￿) < 0, according to Lemma 3 and part (ii) of Propo-
32sition 2, respectively. Thus, according to (A.29) and (A.31), we have ∂W∗/∂ﬂ ￿<0
for all ﬂ ￿ ∈ [0,1) if, for instance, Λ(a∗(ﬂ ￿)) ≥ 0 for all ﬂ ￿ ∈ [0,1).I nt h i sc a s e ,ﬂ ￿ =0
is socially optimal. To con￿rm that ﬂ ￿ =0is possible in social optimum, and in
particular if ε =1 , the following numerical example is considered.
Suppose ε =1 , α = γ =0 .25, zR = zS =0 .5, ρ = β
R = β
S =0 .9 and σ =1 .1.
Thus, a∗(ﬂ ￿)=
p
(1 − ﬂ ￿)/[0.4+1− ﬂ ￿],a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 2 ) ,a n dﬂ ￿ ∈ [0,1) implies
a∗ ∈ (0,
p
5/7]. Hence, ﬂ ￿ =0is socially optimal in this example, if Λ(a∗) ≥ 0 for
all a∗ ∈ (0,
p
5/7]. According to (A.32), Λ(a∗)=9 .775 − (1 − a∗) − 2.5/(a∗ +1 )+
0.25a∗/(1 − a∗) in this numerical example. From this, it is easy to con￿rm that
Λ(a∗) > 0 for all a∗ ∈ (0,
p
5/7],w h i c hc o n ￿rms that ﬂ ￿ =0is socially optimal.
For comparative-static results in Proposition 5, note that both a∗ and ￿ τ are
independent of β
R, β
S and ε,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 2 )a n d( 3 1), respectively. Thus, recalling
a∗ < 1 and (a∗)0(ﬂ ￿) < 0,o n eo b t a i n s∂Q2/∂ﬂ ￿∂v>0 for v = β
S,ε and ∂Q2/∂ﬂ ￿∂β
R <
0, according to (A.31) and (A.32). This concludes the proof. ⁄
Proof of Proposition 6. De￿ne %t ≡ γ(σ − 1)￿t/(1 − ￿t), t ≥ 0.U s i n g( 3 0 )
and (A.29), it is easy to verify that ∂W ∗/∂GR






































Recall ∂2f/∂(τ0)2 ≤ 0 which implies that conditions (A.33) and (A.34) are suﬃcient
to obtain the welfare-maximizing levels of GR
0 and GS
0 (given ￿0). Thus, combining









R) into (A.33) and apply the implicit function theorem to con￿rm that
∂GR
0 /∂β
R > 0, ∂GR
0 /∂β
S < 0 and ∂GR
0 /∂v =0for v = ε,ξ
R,ξ
S.C o m p a r a t i v e -
static results regarding GS
0 can be derived analogously. Moreover, according to (31),
(A.29) and (A.30), it is straightforward to show that ∂W∗/ ﬂ GR = ∂W ∗/ ﬂ GS =0
33implies
σ −
Θ( ﬂ GR+ ﬂ GS)
La∗(￿t)
σ + %t | {z }
=1−￿ τ( ﬂ GR, ﬂ GS,￿t)
ρ(2 − ρ)γβ
R














which are suﬃcient optimality conditions (given ￿t =ﬂ ￿, t ≥ 1). Combining (A.35)
and (A.36) con￿rms (33). Applying the implicit function theorem to (A.35) and
(A.36), by using (33), con￿rms comparative-static results also for t ≥ 1.T h i s
concludes the proof. ⁄
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